Are economic incentives for conservation the answer?
By Capt John McMurray
Garret Hardin coined the phrase “Tragedy of the Commons” in a 1968 article in the Journal Science. Using the example of common grazing lands in medieval England, Hardin sought to show the destruction that humans impose on publicly-owned resources.
Pointing out that common pastures would inevitably become overgrazed and barren as everyone tried to graze their cattle there, he showed that the “Logic of the Commons” ultimately results in the pasture’s ruin as well as the eventual demise of those who depended upon it for survival. If a thoughtful villager decided to not graze cattle on the commons so that the grass could grow back, other villagers would take advantage of the fact and let their cattle consume the grass. Thus, since the pasture was bound to be ruined, the logical course for a villager was to graze as many cattle on the commons as possible, and take maximum advantage of the grass while it lasted.
The parallel to modern day fisheries is clear, and explains why so many fisheries in the US and elsewhere have been chronically overexploited. Fishermen don’t want to decimate fish stocks, but under today’s system, those who land the most fish reap the greatest benefits, and those who take a more conservative approach merely see the fish that they leave behind caught by someone else. Through subsidies and incentives, the government has allowed too many boats to enter fisheries, so that too many boats are chasing too few fish. As a result, many fishermen can barely make ends meet, placing even more emphasis on short-term benefits.
The 1996 amendments to the Magnuson-Stevens Act attempted to tackle the Tragedy of the Commons by amending management requirements in a few key areas. It limited the allowable catch to maximum sustainable yield (the most fish that can be harvested over the long term without harming the population’s ability to grow back); disallowed economic or social justifications for overfishing; required management plans to define overfishing using objective and measurable criteria and established deadlines for ending overfishing and rebuilding depleted populations. Unfortunately, some fishermen sitting on regional fishery management councils, coupled with a lack of political will, led managers to sidestep such provisions in many cases. Unless it was sued, NOAA Fisheries often did not fulfill its legal responsibility to disapprove plans that allowed overfishing to continue, and develop measures to end overfishing if a council failed to do so. A decade after the 1996 amendments, overfishing still plagued many fisheries.
The Magnuson-Stevens Reauthorization Act (MSRA), which was passed late in 2006 despite aggressive attempts to weaken it, contains a number of provisions designed to remedy shortcomings of the 1996 legislation. However, in the law’s first real test, it failed in its purpose, as NOAA Fisheries allowed a 2008 summer flounder harvest considerably higher than its own scientists recommended because of political pressure from the fishing industry. It was not a good harbinger for the new law.
So what’s the answer? Harden, in his Tragedy of the Commons piece, notes that private pastures right next to the over-grazed and barren commons were in good condition. The owner, who had established a property right over those pastures, had a direct interest in controlling the amount of grazing and imposing controls that would keep the grass healthy and plentiful in the long term. Does it make sense to establish such an ownership system with fisheries resources?
Providing secure access to fisheries is not a new concept. Catch shares — referred to as individual fishing quotas, limited access privilege programs, dedicated access programs etc — assign a certain portion of the available fish to specific individuals or groups of fishermen. If a fisherman holds quota share for 1 percent of a fishery with 1,000 fish, he or she would get 10 fish to catch and sell.
There are no days-at-seas limitations or trip limits with such a system. The fishermen decides when to fish, and determines what proportion of the individual quota should be landed on each voyage. Such a system gives fishermen control over when and how often they go to sea. There is no need to race out during inclement conditions to catch as many fish as possible during a limited season. Fishermen may choose to fish when the market is good, thus maximizing their revenue, reducing seafood market fluctuations and providing more price stability than under the current system. Fisherman can then concentrate on delivering a high-quality product instead of trying to catch as many fish as possible in as short of a time as possible.
More importantly, because they have is a vested interest in the fishery, quota share-holders want the population to grow. If there are 2,000 fish five years from now, that fisherman would get 20 fish to catch and sell. So as the fishery grows, shares become more valuable. Hence, it produces a conservation ethic.
Because quota shares could be sold, they also serve to reduce effort. For some, selling quota might serve as a buyout program. Others might rent their quotas to other vessels, reducing the number of boats on the grounds and so limiting both gear damage to habitat and the number of fish discarded. Depending on how the program is set up, environmental groups might purchase some quotas and leave them dormant in order to reduce fishing in a particular fishery, or angling interests might buy them to provide a larger recreational share.
While quota programs have been enthusiastically adopted in some fisheries, they often meet with strong resistance. Restricting access to what some see as the last frontier is a foreign concept to many who view it as inherently un-American. Some argue that catch-share programs privatize what has historically been a public resource, even though the law is clear that holding quota is a privilege that can be revoked much like a driver’s license. Others claim that such a system can marginalize small fishing operations and reward corporate fishing enterprises. But catch share programs can be designed specifically to address these concerns. For example, cooperatives are emerging as a model in New England for the groundfish fishery. It is also likely to result in some loss of jobs as the industry transitions to a slower, year-round business.
While not perfect, quota-share systems do work. New Zealand, Australia, Iceland and British Columbia run catch-share programs that create higher profits for fishermen, less environmental damage and more sustainable fisheries. Today, there are eight catch-share programs operating in U.S. waters all of which seem to get rave reviews from fishermen and environmentalists.
Last March, Environmental Defense released the first data-driven assessment of U.S. catch-share programs. In the surveyed fisheries, such programs were implemented after failures with traditional management approaches. Overall, the fisheries experienced major economic improvements, clear gains in environmental conditions, and a mixed impact on social conditions. Compliance with total allowable catch increased and bycatch and habitat destruction decreased. There was less job related injury and a higher percentage of fishermen employed. Negative effects included some job losses; private economic gains at public expense; and in some cases increased consolidation. Generally, however, the newer programs addressed these concerns through improved program design.
MSRA establishes comprehensive standards to be followed when regional fishery management councils establish catch share programs. NMFS has yet to produce guidelines on who is eligible for quota and in some cases (e.g., Gulf of Mexico and New England) who can vote in industry referenda for approval of the programs. Another key question is how are the shares of a fishery to be allocated: By traditional individual rights, historical landings or sold to the highest bidder? These are all issues that need to be worked out fair and equitably before any catch-share program can be implemented.
Catch share systems are coming. The New England Fishery Management Council is pushing forward with a program that would allocate shares of the groundfish harvest to the different industry sectors. The South Atlantic council is well on its way to Limited Access Privilege Programs in snapper-grouper fisheries. And the Mid-Atlantic council is developing a IFQ program for tilefish.
Without a doubt, some fishermen are going to be closed out. That’s not good, but the alternative, as three decades of traditional fisheries management has shown, is a Tragedy of the Commons.